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Friendship, bitching, and the making of ethical selves: what it means to be a good friend 
among girls in a London school 
 
SARAH WINKLER-REID 
Newcastle University 
This article explores the relationship between friendship, personhood, and ethics among 
girls in a London school. While a Western ideal of friendship is posited as a personal, private, 
and spontaneous relationship between autonomous individuals, I argue that girls’ 
friendships are a complex entanglement and interaction between forensic and mimetic 
dimensions of the self. Girls’ ideals of friendship, and practices of making friends, suggest 
forensic pre-constituted selves acting with volition in order to become closer to other 
selves. However, bitching, exclusion, and breaking friendships foreground mimetic 
dimensions as girls shape each other and themselves according to gendered ethical criteria. 
Examining these analytical strands offers insight into how individuality is produced through 
sociality in everyday life.  
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Friendship, bitching, and the making of ethical selves: what it means to be a good friend 
among girls in a London school 
 
I remember when me and Lara first started to become friends, we were working on a 
project together, we started chatting and it was like, everything she said was just like ‘yes!’ 
You know? We totally got each other. We started spending all our time together. We’d 
always be on the phone or having sleepovers at each other’s houses. It’s difficult to explain 
but she was like a drug, she was the most amazing person to be with, it sounds strange but I 
just had to be with her.  
Then suddenly things changed. She started sitting with Katia, and not saving a space 
for me, she told her things but wouldn't tell me. Then one day I came into school and she 
wouldn’t talk to me, I didn’t know what I’d done wrong and she wouldn’t tell me, she just 
cut me off ‘bam’. I was really depressed, I used to dread coming into school and every day I 
used to cry after school ... Afterwards I found out she’d been bitching about me with Katia, 
saying I copied her all the time and was really annoying.  
Lilian 
 
Lillian’s story about the rise and fall of a friendship is still deeply felt and emotionally told, 
even though it occurred three years prior, when she was 12. As her account suggests, 
friendship between girls in school is a source of emotional investment; great highs (‘she was 
like a drug’) and terrible lows (‘every day I used to cry after school’). In the London 
secondary school in which I did my fieldwork, it would be hard to overestimate the 
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importance of friendship for girls. Of all the things I heard them disagree about, the value of 
friendship was never debated.  
 Friendship is idealized by girls through notions of similarity, closeness, and depth: 
friends choose each other because they have much in common, they ‘get each other’; they 
are physically and emotionally close, ‘there for each other’; and they allow the expression of 
a true self, ‘the real me’, without fear of judgement. These descriptions mirror the Western 
ideal, advocated in the scholarly literature for hundreds of years. Friendships are personal, 
private, and voluntary relationships between autonomous individuals; they are based on 
choice and free will, and entail sentiment and intimacy (Allan 1979; Carrier 1999; Montaigne 
2004 [1603]; Paine 1969). As scholars have noted, this ideal of friendship also implies a 
corresponding notion of the person: a pre-constituted inner self, an independent individual 
existing prior to social relations and the locus of autonomous intentionality (Carrier 1999; 
Spencer & Pahl 2006).  
 However, while girls' friendships may be spontaneous, personal, and private, they 
are also public and governed by social conventions, and while friends may be chosen, 
friendship in school is practically compulsory – to be without friends is an unequivocal sign 
of social failure. Bitching (saying negative things about someone behind their back) and 
exclusion, as well as positive recognition and belonging, are common experiences of 
friendship.  Furthermore, while sentiment and affection are certainly a characteristic of girls’ 
friendships in school, to understand them only in these terms is to ignore the range of 
affects these relationships entail (Evans 2010). In this article, I argue that an analysis of the 
complexities of girls’ friendships can direct us towards a more satisfactory understanding of 
the person implied by these relations.  
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 Girls’ ideals of friendship both bolster and are structured by an ideology of the 
individual. However, this ideology is thrown into relief by practices through which girls 
actively and tenaciously shape each other. These processes map on to Michael Lambek’s 
(2013) distinction between the forensic (self-same, unfolding over time, and continuous) 
and the mimetic (imitative, iterative, and discontinuous) as contrastive yet mutually 
constitutive aspects of personhood. I argue that this distinction illuminates the seemingly 
contradictory workings of girls’ friendships, and the ways in which they manifest particular 
aspects of the self. Practices such as making friends invoke notions of forensic individuality, 
manifesting ‘temporal continuity in the life of the individual while relatively disregarding 
continuity with other persons’ (Lambek 2013: 849). At the same time, however, practices of 
bitching, exclusion, and breaking friends emphasize the mimetic, relational dimensions of 
personhood, manifesting ‘continuity with other persons while relatively disregarding 
temporal continuity in the life of the person’ (Lambek 2013: 849). While Lambek focuses on 
the ‘the public side of personhood’ and frames his argument in broad cross-cultural and 
historical terms, I use his forensic and mimetic distinction to explore the specifics of a 
particular kind of selfhood emerging between young people in London. I also shed light on 
the gendered nature of this production, focusing on the intimate, everyday ways girls make 
themselves, in relation to each other and ideologies of the individual person.  
 More broadly, this article contributes to anthropological accounts which delineate 
the complexity of Western ideas and practices of personhood, and in the process collapse 
simplistic distinctions between ‘Western individualized’ persons and  ‘non-Western “joined-
up”’ persons (Carsten 2004: 83-4; see also Evans 2010; Holland & Kipnis 1994; Kusserow 
1999; Ouroussoff 1993). As Alexandra Ouroussoff argued twenty years ago, while 
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anthropologists carefully observe and analyse practices of ‘exotic’ personhood 
ethnographically, they have uncritically accepted the idea that ‘Western society’ is 
comprised of individuals. These ideas are derived from a tradition of liberal philosophy (of 
which anthropology is also a part), rather than the study of the ‘day-to-day experience of 
westerners’ (Ouroussoff 1993: 284). Furthermore, she argues, this idea of ‘us’ as individuals 
acts as the lens through which anthropologists analyse ‘them’, structuring and reinforcing 
the long-standing antinomy between the two. James Laidlaw recently identified a continuing 
tendency for anthropologists to use ‘dyadic, us/them, West/Other contrasts’ in writing on 
personhood as one of four key impediments to the development of an anthropology of 
morality and ethics (2014: 33). In this vein, I seek to contribute to a ‘truly social conception 
of the Western person’ (Ouroussoff 1993: 284), while at the same time taking seriously 
individuality as an illusion that creates reality (281; Toren 2012).  
Ethics and personhood  
The analysis of the ethical dimensions of friendship and personhood is key to this discussion. 
As Lambek argues, ethics are intrinsic to both continuous and discontinuous dimensions of 
personhood. He defines ethics as ‘the condition in the first instance of being subject to 
judgement (in the broad sense of discernment)’ (Lambek 2013: 840). Criteria for judgement 
are established in performative acts and subsequent practice, and events are judged 
accordingly.  From this perspective, personhood is always ethical. ‘Persons are human 
beings under a set of descriptions, criteria, and commitments put into place by means of 
successive performative acts. These descriptions render them in the first instance as ethical 
subjects’ (2013: 845).  
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 [Building on Lambek’s argument, I demonstrate that in the context of their 
friendships, girls judge each other according to gendered criteria – what it means to be a 
good friend and what it means to be a good person – and act on these judgements, for 
example through bitching and exclusion.  Friendship in school is both contingent on being 
assessed as an acceptable person and a necessary prerequisite for being viewed as 
acceptable. Through these frequent exchanges of evaluation and judgement, girls are 
making (and sometimes unmaking) each other as ethical persons under a large set of criteria 
concerning both appearance and behaviour, from the major (character) to the minor 
(fingernails). 
 This rendering of friendship and ethical personhood can thus be situated within 
‘ordinary ethics’ (Lambek 2010) and, more broadly, the rapidly emerging field of morality 
and ethics in anthropology. While the ‘frontier-like quality’ of this ‘ethical turn’ may mean 
that the theoretical positions and key intellectual debates are yet to be firmly established 
(Robbins 2012), ordinary ethics represents one approach around which some scholars are 
beginning to coalesce (or critique, e.g. Zigon 2014). While other theorizations seek to make 
a distinction between ordinary action with its norm-governed morality, and distinct 
moments of ethical deliberation (e.g. Robbins 2007; Zigon 2008), ordinary ethics 
foregrounds the routine and everyday as a key site of moral work (Das 2012; Lambek 2010; 
Mattingly 2013; Stafford 2013). However, while the ethical is understood as ubiquitous in 
activity, practice, and judgement, it ‘does not simply go without saying’ (Lambek 2010: 28), 
and so can be studied through attention to the practices and actions of everyday life.  
 Bringing recent anthropological debates on morality and ethics into dialogue with 
the anthropology of childhood and youth, Anne-Meike Fechter has highlighted the value of 
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ordinary ethics, which can train our attention on the ways in which the ethical becomes 
manifest in the banal and unspectacular sites of growing up and micro-contestations 
between peers (2014: 148). As Charles Stafford (2013) indicates, this approach also 
dovetails well with the growing recognition that socialization, including moral learning, is 
not the straightforward transmission and absorption of generational knowledge, but an 
active process of meaning-making and creating anew (e.g. Evans 2006; Toren 1999).  
The study of friendship  
Engaging with this ‘ethical turn’ in anthropology, Valerio Simoni and Jason Throop argue 
that attention to friendship’s ‘complex entanglements with morality’ can shed light on the 
‘problematic and contested character of friendship’ (2014: 4). While these are new 
developments in the literature, there is a longer-standing interest in the relation between 
friendship and personhood. Angela Torresan (2011) identifies two significant theoretical and 
methodological strands within the anthropological study of friendship. In one strand, 
authors view friendship as a particular kind of relationship dependent on a Western notion 
of the autonomous individual. In contrast, a second strand of the literature views friendship 
as an idiom of social relatedness found in almost all societies, enabling some scholars to 
explore the relationship between friendship and different modes of personhood.   
 In the case of the former strand, as Torresan highlights, friendship is conceptualized 
as a product of capitalist transformations, which separate individuals from society, and 
private from public (e.g. Allan 1989; Carrier 1999; Paine 1969, Pitt-Rivers 1973; but cf. 
Course 2010). For example, James Carrier (1999) accepts the Western ideal of friendship as 
based on spontaneous and unconstrained sentiment emerging from an internal source, and 
argues that this conception presupposes a particular notion of the autonomous individual 
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existing prior to social relations. In contrast, when personhood is understood as constituted 
by social relations, such as in Melanesia, we cannot speak of friendship.  
 Carrier starts from a narrow ideal of friendship and so establishes a correspondingly 
narrow definition of ‘selves who can be friends’. In contrast, in the latter strand of literature 
on friendship, scholars have focused on how friendships are constituted in practice, and 
defined by friends themselves, highlighting that models and practices of friendship can vary 
considerably, ‘making it difficult to offer a single, all-encompassing definition of Friendship 
with a capital F’ (Santos-Granero 2007: 9; see also Bell & Coleman 1999; Killick & Desai 
2010). In this understanding, the scope of practices and affects constituting friendship can 
highlight aspects of personhood that go against the grain of dominant ideologies of the 
person.  For example, Gillian Evans (2010) shows that friendship among the South London 
boys in her study was characterized not by sentiment and affection, but by admiration, 
competition, and rivalry.  Through these affects, the boys were producing themselves in 
relation to those around them; the intersubjective nature of the processes of friendship 
representing a challenge to conventional ideas about the autonomy of the modern Western 
person.  
 A number of other Euro-American ethnographic studies have also highlighted the 
very different modes of friendship for boys and for girls in school. Gender, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, emerges as an ‘omnirelevant’ principle of categorization in peer relations 
and networks (Sweden –Evaldsson 2007: 384; UK – Evans 2006; Hey 1997; Renold 2004; USA 
– Goodwin 2006; Thorne 1993).  For example, in her ethnography of girls’ friendships in two 
British schools, Valerie Hey demonstrates that in the context of a gendered hierarchy of 
visibility and space, girls’ friendships often play out in the private and intimate 
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‘interpersonal recesses of schooling’ (1997: 30). By focusing our attention on these recesses, 
we can begin to untangle ‘the dense relationship between forms of subjectivity produced in 
the privacy of girls’ interpersonal lives and public forms of social power and regulation’ 
(1997: 29). Furthermore, she argues, it is the private, personal, and intimate nature of these 
conduits of social meaning and power that make them so effective. Similarly, linguistically 
focused research has detailed ‘the constitutive effect of talk on gender, friendship, and 
morality’ (Evaldsson 2007: 380), and the ways in which girls as friends engage in ‘relational 
talk’ and ‘collaborative judgement work’ in order to morally index and order, exert power, 
and exclude or include (Sweden – Evaldsson 2007: 377, USA – Goodwin 2006).  
 
Making friends in school  
My fourteen-month fieldwork1 took place in Collingson School, a large, non-selective, 
mixed-sex school in a relatively affluent area of London, between the suburbs and the inner 
city. The national school inspectorate body describes the school’s 'social make-up' as 
'average', with about 20 per cent of pupils receiving free school meals – a ‘rough proxy of 
poverty’ (Gillborn 2001: 7).  The school is racially and ethnically diverse, ‘“mixed”-up roots 
and global routes’ (Pollock 2004: 35) coexist with a simplified system of racial classification  
in terms of black, white, and Asian.  In these simplified terms, approximately 35 per cent of 
pupils identify as white, 20 per cent as black, and 20 per cent as Asian. Other pupils are not 
classified within this simplified racial triad, and identify themselves in terms of ethnicity 
(Winkler-Reid 2015).  
 Virtually all friendship groups in Collingson School exist within the boundary of the 
year group. Mirroring this organization, I spent the majority of my fieldwork with Year 11, 
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15-16 year olds in their last year of compulsory schooling, attending lessons and spending 
lunch- and breaktimes with the different friendship groups within the year.2 The majority of 
groups in Year 11 were single gender,3 these gendered groups displaying spatialized 
patterns of interaction. The boys’ groups tend to be large and mobile, playing football or 
moving around the playground like shoals of fish. In contrast, the girls’ groups tend to be 
smaller, stationary, and tightly clustered.4 These visual differences also reflect the ways in 
which girls constitute relationships of intimacy and proximity, and use these relations as 
gender-appropriate ways to exert power. In this context, while ‘acting big’ was valued in 
boys as an indication of high status, it was viewed as unacceptable for girls as a 
transgression of appropriate femininity (Hey 1997). As I will discuss later in this article, 
friendship offers a gender-appropriate means by which girls can exert their will, in intimate 
but no less potent ways.  
 As Peggy Froerer (2010) notes, while the observation that people who share the 
same social space are more likely to become friends seems self-evident, the particular ways 
in which proximity enables friendships of different kinds to develop has been underexplored 
in the anthropological literature (see also Dyson 2010; Santos-Granero 2007 and). The 
institutional structure of school clearly shapes the conditions and possibilities of friendship.5 
Pupils are required to attend school seven hours a day, five days a week, segregated from 
the rest of society, and processed in narrow, age-specific groupings.  As Vered Amit-Talai 
identifies, this specific organization of children and young people, typical in the West, 
‘compresses and hence intensifies adolescent peer interaction’ (1995: 153). In school, peers 
encounter each other every day, and social distance is extremely hard to maintain. In this 
context, not making friends is an unequivocal sign of social failure, and the pupils in my 
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study saw being friendless as lonely and isolating. Great pains were taken by girls to 
minimize the time they spent alone – even when walking from one lesson to the next, or in 
the toilets. The importance of visibly having friends indicates that friendship in school 
necessarily involves both public and private dimensions. Friendships are personal and 
individual, and at the same conducted under the intense observation of peers in the public 
space of school (Amit-Talai 1995).  
Sameness  
While some friendships in school are defined in terms of difference,6 this article focuses on 
friendships based on notions of similarity, closeness, and depth. These friendships are 
normally part of wider network of peer group relations, and are the ones in which girls 
invest the most time and emotion.  The girls in my fieldwork discussed similarity in terms of 
shared ‘priorities’, ‘tastes’,  ‘values’, ‘sense of humour’, and ‘opinions on other people’.  One 
girl, Sejal, told me that friendships are based on ‘what people wear and what music they 
listen to’, but also, as they grow older, on ‘what people say and do’. Jenny offered an 
example, ‘Like some people only care about drinking, they don’t think GCSEs7 are important, 
they’re not the sort of people we’d be friends with now’.  It was less usual for the girls to 
discuss similarities with friends in terms of broader commonalities such as class or race.  
 The girls’ emphasis on the personal aspects of similarity, tastes, styles, and 
orientation to formal education evokes Bourdieu and habitus as a ‘system of durable, 
transposable dispositions’ which structure practice (1977: 53). As Cheleen Mahar, Richard 
Harker, and Chris Wilkes assert, ‘[O]ne’s place [in the social field] and one’s habitus form the 
basis of friendship, love and other personal relationships’ (1990: 10). But if habitus, as a 
‘durable disposition’, has analytical appeal in forensic (self-same and temporally continuous) 
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terms, it fails to account for the mimetic (iterating and imitating) manifestations of social 
commonalities observable in school. As a space apart from family, school allows pupils a 
flexibility of presentation and practice, ways of ‘standing, speaking, walking’ (Bourdieu 
1977: 70), matching peers rather than parents.  
 In response to Bourdieu’s theory of habitus, Christina Toren suggests a simpler 
formulation: ‘[O]ver time every one of us makes meaning for ourselves (i.e. autonomously) 
out of meanings that others have made and are making; this inherently social process 
manifests itself as a transformational process in which continuity resides’ (2012: 72).  In this 
way, generational and collective history continually informs personal history, which is both 
structuring of experience, and evinced and transformed as it is lived. The specific 
intersubjective processes of girls’ friendships both produce, and are structured by, these 
‘collective-cum-personal histories’ (Toren 2012: 64). In contrast to Bourdieu, Toren’s 
transformational approach allows us to account for both the forensic and mimetic 
expressions of social commonality observable in school and to recognize that both have 
their own histories. Relatedly, as Lambek argues, ‘there is a whole ethics to history and 
social change’ as performative acts recalibrate criteria and ‘shift the ethical context’ (2010: 
56). Broader ethical shifts, for example in relation to gender, form part of the collective 
history from which the micro-ethical criteria of girls’ friendships are constituted.  
 Ethnicity and race – connected but not synonymous – demonstrate the complex 
entanglement of social commonality in school that necessitates recognition of both the 
forensic and mimetic as structuring dimensions. For instance, ethnicity is salient in terms of 
a geographical history shared with parents, grandparents, and so on (‘Where do you come 
from?’ as the ethnic question par excellence: Wade 1997). At the same time, there is a 
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simplified racial classification system (black, white, and Asian) in operation.8 While these 
two dimensions were understood by pupils in forensic terms, as more or less unchanging 
aspects of a person, a third aspect of ethnicity-race needs to be understood in mimetic 
terms. Pupils of any ethnicity-race could engage in black or white coded youth practice and 
style, observable, for instance, in particular, racialized ways of talking and dressing (Chun 
2011; Winkler-Reid, 2015). Furthermore, these mimetic expressions of racialized London-
based youth practice and style have their own histories (cf. Back 1996; Wulff 1995). The girls 
in my fieldwork might identify none, some, or all of these aspects of ethnicity-race as 
relevant to notions of similarity and ‘shared-ness’ in their friendships. However, it was the 
mimetic, racially coded dimensions of youth style and practice that were the most 
structuring of friendship groups. Likewise, ethical criteria established in judgements 
between friends may, or may not, have a racialized or ethicized dimension (‘That’s not the 
way a black girl should act’, ‘We don’t do that kind of thing as Columbians’), depending on a 
range of factors.  
 Thus, girls’ friendships are historically constituted and part of a larger order of things 
that is manifested both forensically and mimetically, judged according to a subtle multitude 
of ethical criteria, and transformed in the process of being lived. Consequently, ideas of 
similarity and difference emerge in manifold ways in the context of friendship. As outlined 
above, the particular focus of this article is an exploration of friendship in relation to 
individual personhood and gender – both understood by pupils as a self-evident and 
overarching aspect of similarity, as something (that ‘should’ be) shared by everyone.   
Depth and proximity  
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In addition to similarity, friendship is understood in terms of depth and proximity. Friends 
acknowledge and accept you for ‘who you are’ – the real internal you. With friends you can 
‘be yourself’ without fear of judgement.  Best friends Eleanor, Megan, and Jane explained 
the importance of their friendships. Eleanor said, ‘I’m really, really shy, it doesn’t really show 
when I’m in front of my best friends and stuff because they’re the only people with who I 
feel completely comfortable’. I asked why they feel comfortable with each other. Megan 
answered, ‘Because they know you’, Jane adding, ‘Because I know they like me’.  
 Friendships were defined by the girls according to degrees of closeness (friend, close 
friend, really close friend, best friend), with the understanding that even within one group 
of friends, different people will be closer than others. Some girls declared their best 
friendship as one of the first things they told me about themselves. Their description of their 
best friend as ‘my other half’ or ‘like we’re one person’ attests to an ideal of best friendship 
as the closest sameness. 
 On the day I first met Samantha and Sejal, they declared ‘we are best friends’. Their 
time in school was choreographed to manifest and express closeness, sameness, and 
constant exchange. Working against the confines of the lesson timetable that routinely 
separated them, Samantha and Sejal met before and after school, and the first thing they 
did when the bell rang was to seek each other out among the pupils milling through the 
corridors. They hugged and kissed, even if they had been apart for just one lesson; they 
linked arms, held hands as they chatted with other friends, or stood a little way off from the 
rest of the group, heads close together, whispering – visibly sharing their secrets. When 
Sejal told of a fight with her parents, Samantha listened to her vent, and when Samantha 
was let down by a boy, Sejal comforted her as she cried, and reassured her that he was the 
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one making the mistake. One word, an elliptical reference to a private joke, could send them 
into fits of laughter. They made plans for sleepovers or parties on Friday, and on Monday 
they happily recounted their activities back to each other.  
 As suggested by the lengths Sejal and Samantha went to, shared time and space is a 
vital expression of the closeness of a friendship.9  Best friends spend all available time 
together within school, and as much as possible outside school. The closer the friend, the 
closer the area of proximity: hand-holding, arm-linking, hugging, and sitting on laps are all 
ways to express closeness with friends. Shared time and space is also important in the 
maintenance of friendship groups, indicated by a commitment to spend as much free time 
(e.g. lunch- and break-times) as possible in a designated shared space. Spending a significant 
amount of time with another group outside lessons – spending time alone is not an option – 
is a sign of tenuous or shifting loyalties.  
You’re friends with a lot of people but you just don’t hang out with them at lunch 
because there are just set places. There are such specific places that if I was to go 
specifically from the canteen to the field it would be like saying [in mock serious 
voice] ‘Bye group, I’m going with this group’, it would be such an extreme thing 
(Jane). 
 
 Within this shared space and time, talk is the primary medium of exchange (James 
1995). Girls use every possible opportunity to talk, talking up to (and often beyond) the last 
second before the demands of formal schooling are imposed by teachers. When friends are 
required to be apart, they extend their opportunities, over the phone or via instant 
messenger.. Whether discussing last night’s TV, passing on a juicy piece of gossip, making 
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plans for the weekend, or offering advice, friends talk. Talk between friends is a key place in 
which ‘the social is indexed’ (Hey 1997). In these processes of identification, categorization, 
and classification, girls manifest, transform, and reflect on a larger order of things, including 
ethical criteria, as I will expand on later. Like space and time, the closer the friendship, the 
more talk is expected, and the more effort is made to create opportunities for talking. When 
Kadia told me the story of her friendship group, she explained that within the group some 
people are closer to each other than others. She illustrated this in terms of talk. Samiya and 
Grace are ‘not that close, they had a falling out a few years ago, they’re alright now, but 
they still don’t speak on the phone or anything’. 
 Within talk, disclosure is particularly important. As in Amit-Talai’s study, ‘intentional 
disclosures’ were made ‘to deepen the intimacy of friendship. Friends deliberately divulged 
material that would not otherwise be readily available through school interaction’ (1995: 
156). It is both the information that is important in disclosure and also the act. Within 
school, disclosure is visible as friends physically remove themselves from the rest of the 
group, turn their backs, or whisper in each other’s ears. Again, what is disclosed, and the 
frequency of disclosure, are expressions of the closeness of a friendship, with the 
understanding that best friends ‘tell each other everything’.  
 These practices and exchanges of friendship mirror the Western ideal of ‘like-
minded’ selves sharing time and space and revealing their depths without fear of judgement 
(‘We can tell each other everything’). Making friends illustrates the forensic dimension of 
the person, as ‘an agent, characterized by her own actions and accountable for them’ 
(Lambek 2013: 849). Pre-constituted selves act with volition in order to become closer to 
other pre-constituted selves (‘people I like’, ‘my sort of people’). In other words, selves who 
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can be friends come first, and friendship comes second (Carrier 1999). However, as we will 
now see, girls’ friendships also entail the mimetic shaping of selves (own and others).  
Breaking friends in school  
The same resources used to make friends, and maintain or increase closeness, can be used 
to increase distance or end friendships. School is littered with painful stories of exclusion, 
break-ups or ‘dumpings’ (non-reciprocal break-ups), and peer groups divided or 
permanently split by the acrimonious end of a friendship. Spending less time together, no 
longer sharing the same space, not disclosing or not speaking, are all signs of rupture. To 
halt the exchanges of friendship is to end the friendship, and girls often say ‘We don’t talk 
anymore’ to mean a friendship has ended. This might be explained in terms of a gradual 
‘growing apart’ (‘We didn’t have much in common anymore’). Often, however, the end of 
friendships, or their temporary suspension, is justified in terms of ethical judgements based 
on gendered criteria of ‘how friends should act’, and ‘how girls should act’. Furthermore, as 
I will also discuss in this section, exclusion and inclusion offer girls a gender-appropriate 
medium of intersubjective influence. 
 Sejal and Samantha were close friends with Nadia (unusually she has a long-term 
boyfriend in place of a ‘best friend’), and together they made up a subgroup within a larger, 
mainly male, peer group, the ‘Misfits’ (see note 4). I got to know them well, so I was 
surprised to hear that, until recently, Nadege had been part of this close group – I had never 
seen them so much as acknowledge each other, even though they were in many of the 
same lessons. Sejal later told me that she, Nadia, and Samantha ‘stopped talking’ to Nadege 
because she was ‘talking behind their backs’ and because she liked to ‘mess with people’. 
Now Nadege will not speak to them either. More alert to the interactions between these 
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former friends, I observed in lessons how the girls carefully maintained space between 
themselves, ensuring they never had to sit next to each other. In one lesson, Nadege 
whispered to Jenny, Jenny sighed and asked Sejal to pass the paper – avoiding even the 
most functional exchange. 
 The exchange of talk is a subtle and powerful tool to express disapproval and 
unhappiness towards a friend and its withdrawal is not always permanent. Maria was upset 
when her close friend Cheryl got together with a boy she had recently split up with, 
especially as she felt Cheryl was ‘always doing things like this’. Maria did not tell Cheryl this 
directly but instead stopped talking to her, with her reasons passed on by friends. After a 
few months Maria decided to start talking to Cheryl again because, ‘He’s only a guy and it 
isn’t worth losing a friend over’. 
 Nadege and Cheryl were both judged as ‘bad friends’ according to ethical criteria of 
how friends should act: Nadege was not ‘nice enough’, while Cheryl put a boy before the 
friendship. Both girls upset their friends, and were sanctioned through the withdrawal of 
talk. Furthermore, even if a girl’s behaviour does not directly impact on their friends, it may 
still be punished. Actions judged wrong have the potential to reflect badly on friends, 
highlighting mimetic dimensions of the person ‘as a subject, informed by others and their 
representations’ (Lambek 2013: 849). For example, if a friend is behaving like ‘a slag’ (acting, 
or appearing to act, sexually promiscuously), she will often be sanctioned by friends, not 
because it affects the friendship, but because it may lead to a ‘bad reputation’ for both the 
girl herself, and her friendship group (Winkler-Reid 2014). 
 Similarly, non-disclosure is a resource for ending friendship or increasing distance. A 
friend withholding information which they share with others is viewed by girls as a clear 
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indicator that something is wrong in the relationship. As recounted at the start of this 
article, Lillian knew there was something wrong between her and Lara because ‘she stopped 
telling me things’. Shortly after, Lara stopped talking to her completely and their friendship 
ended. 
 In Year 9, Georgia was excluded completely from all friendship networks. Rhiannon, 
who admits to being instrumental in her exclusion, recounts: ‘You know Georgia? Well, all 
band two10 hated her and they made her come into our band but we all hated her as well’.  
Her misdemeanour was transgressing the feminine imperative to act humbly: ‘She just 
thought herself better than everyone, so then me and some of our friends didn’t want her 
talking to us so we were just really rude to her so she said we were bullying her and then 
there was this massive thing like Mean Girls’.11  In time, Georgia managed to rehabilitate her 
position in the year by learning to work within the gendered conventions of her peers, 
acting more humbly, and so becoming ‘less annoying’ and ‘more liked’, as Lexy, Rhiannon’s 
friend recognized: ‘Georgia has changed a lot, she’s really different. She was really annoying. 
No one really liked her before’.  
 As we can see, the resources of friendship are not only used to make or break 
personal and private relationships, but are also a collective project of defining, producing, 
and acting upon the ethical conventions of action in school. Most of the girls in my research 
accepted the practice of exclusion as legitimate, even if they questioned the legitimacy of 
some acts of exclusion, or the truth of justifications given (‘I think they’re being out of 
order’). Furthermore, the point where a friend stops being a friend is performative, 
changing the criteria by which both parties will be judged. Former friends are no longer 
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mimetically connected, ‘like we’re one person’, with intertwined reputations.  Instead the 
ex-friend is held as a person forensically responsible for her actions. 
 The ability to exclude, either singly or communally, also offers girls the ability to 
exert their will. ‘The idea of the will implies agency and choice between possible actions. It 
also implies a kind of determination to carry out an action once it has been chosen; a 
positive drive or desire to accomplish an action’ (Stewart & Strathern 2010: 140). More 
specifically, exertion of will in this context represents the (successful) extension of 
intersubjective influence, formed through the dynamics of action, ‘by means of specific 
practices’ (Munn 1986: 10) – getting other people to do what you want (or not do what you 
do not want).  
 Through the practices of friendship, successful girls are able to control who can talk 
to whom and who can spend time with whom, and where (Evans 2006). In these ways, they 
can influence both the behaviour and relations of others, and constitute formations of time 
and space. The intimate scale of these interactions contributes to their potency; being 
excluded by friends, those supposed to recognize your ‘true self’ and related to you in terms 
of similarity and closeness, is particularly painful. Furthermore, this exertion of will through 
friendship is gender-appropriate, intimacy guarding against the gendered transgression of 
‘acting big’.  
 In this section, I have described friendship both as a criterion for ethical judgement, 
and as a medium of intersubjective influence. These two dimensions of girls’ friendships are 
not mutually exclusive. It is often the judged wrongness of actions that is used to justify 
exclusion. Girls extend their intersubjective influence to create social fields, to shape each 
Author’s version 
21 
 
other, and also to separate themselves. To break a friendship is to stop being connected, 
and to make each party responsible for her own actions.   
‘Girls just have a bitchy nature’: bitching as practice and performance 
]epi[I think with girls they’re just analytical about how other girls act and they’re just 
judgemental ... It’s because of bitchiness, girls know that they’re going to be 
analysed about everything they do. I think with girls it’s mainly like, ‘Did you see her 
wearing that?’, ‘She’s talking to that person and I don’t like it’, ‘She’s talking to that 
boy, what does she think she’s doing?’. 
Caroline 
 
I think everyone bitches about their close friends, because they know the most 
about them so they know what to bitch about, they know more. I think everyone 
bitches about their friends. 
Lexy 
Bitching – ‘when you talk bad about other people, when you’re nice to someone’s face and 
then the next thing you’re talking about them’ – further exemplifies the ways in which girls 
as (dis)continuous persons hold each other to ethical account. While exclusion is often 
preceded and accompanied by bitching (which justifies the exclusion), these practices do 
not necessarily go hand in hand. If practices of inclusion and exclusion can be understood in 
terms of distance (drawing closer, pushing away), bitching can be understood in terms of 
hierarchical difference (‘she’s like that, and, [by implication], I’m not’). Thus, the forensic 
nature of the self, ‘what I’m like as opposed to what she’s like’, is emphasized. As Ruby 
explains, ‘It sounds funny but they are your friends, it would never go to they dislike you, it’s 
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just that you annoy them a little bit’. ‘Yeah, because there’s a difference between not liking 
someone and bitching about them’, adds Samiya.  
 So while girls idealize friendship in terms of ‘depth’, bitching highlights the dangers 
of being known. Friendship poses a ‘delicate see-saw between concealment and revelation’ 
(Amit-Talai 1995: 156). On the one hand, self-exposure is necessary for the creation of 
intimacy and expression of depth.  On the other hand, bitching is a continuous reminder of 
vulnerability as a result of revelation. The forensic is further evinced when we consider that 
bitching is a form of disclosure, sharing what you ‘really think’ about a person as a way to 
recognize like-minded selves, and so is a practice in the making and maintenance of 
friendship. However, bitching also acts to shape the behaviour of others and is a 
performative, iterative act that can instantiate new criteria by which girls (both speaker and 
target) are subsequently judged. Thus, the forensic dimensions of bitching are implicated in 
its mimetic effects. 
 Both girls and boys see bitching as a ‘natural quality’ of girls. The popular rhetoric is 
that girls deal with tensions and disagreements by bitching, while boys ‘have it out’ 
physically. Girls and boys work together to maintain this rhetoric, despite the contrary 
evidence that boys do bitch, and fighting is rare for both boys and girls. The ‘naturalness’ of 
bitching means that it is viewed as an inevitable part of friendship. With few exceptions, the 
girls in my study accepted that bitching between friends was ’just the way it is’. In addition, 
the covertness of bitching enables girls to maintain the gendered ideals of friendship as 
‘close sameness’, while also judging each other according to a range of ethical criteria, 
including interrelated ideas about how girls should act and how friends should act.  
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 One breaktime, sat closely with Sejal and Dee Dee on the wall, Nadia reported an 
altercation between Georgia and Samantha she had just witnessed: 
Nadia: Georgia was having a go at Samantha, because Samantha had had a go at Ling 
about her birthday. 
Dee Dee: Yeah, Samantha was really upset that Ling had forgotten her birthday. 
Sejal:  I don’t know why Georgia got involved, it has nothing to do with her. 
Nadia: And how would Georgia feel if Ling forgot her birthday? 
Dee Dee: Apparently Ling never remembers anyone’s birthday. 
Nadia: I don’t know how though, because it was up on Facebook. 
Sejal: She can be really self-centred. 
In this bitching exchange, both Georgia and Ling are the targets. In the case of Georgia, the 
girls are questioning her right to talk (‘I don’t know why Georgia got involved, it has nothing 
to do with her’) – articulating conventions on communication. With Ling, they are critical of 
her behaviour (forgetting Sam’s birthday), particularly as it is not a one-off (‘Ling never 
remembers anyone’s birthday’). Furthermore, it is not only Ling’s actions being judged as 
selfish but her character (‘she can be really self-centred’). Thus in their bitching the girls are 
articulating conventions of communication, exchange, and a gendered, ethical position on 
how friends should treat each other (Evaldsson 2007; Goodwin 2006; Shuman 1986).  And 
through their bitching, the girls are defining themselves positively in contrast (as people 
who remember birthdays and so are not ‘self-centred’). Both of these aspects are 
performative, in that they can change the criteria by which both the bitchers and the 
bitched-about are subsequently judged (as self-centred or empathetic).  
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 Bitching acts as a constant reminder of the micro-surveillance that girls place each 
other under. As a form of communication that happens behind the back of the target, it also 
encourages second-guessing, doubt, and the impetus to subject yourself to the judgement 
you imagine others might be subjecting you to: 
I hate the way that everything between girls is implied. You spend all your time 
trying to read between the lines, you don’t know if someone is annoyed or angry 
with you, and even if they were they wouldn’t say. You’re always worried you’ve 
done something wrong, and you go over what you’ve said or done just in case. It can 
be really tiring (Sejal).  
The minutiae of bitching further increase its effects; every detail of the self may be subject 
to judgement.  Samiya describes: ‘Girls will bitch about everything, from your features to 
your personality, even your toes! Like there was this rumour going around that Samiya’s got 
ugly toes. Even your nails! Like so and so has got such dirty fingernails’.  
 
Like inclusion and exclusion, bitching also represents a powerful medium of intersubjective 
influence. Covert and between friends (or potential friends), bitching can enable domination 
by intimacy. Michael observes: 
Girls being friends with girls is a really nasty kind of relationship. Most of what you 
hear is girls bitching about other girls. A guy will try to be really macho but actually 
there is the same kind of thing for girls to do with status and how you outwardly 
appear … there is a hierarchy but it exists behind the groups, the groups are kind of 
like a front. Like a girl will be in a group of supposedly ‘best friends’ and will then go 
and bitch to some other girls about their ‘best friends’.  
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 Competent bitching involves appreciating the nuanced criteria by which friends, girls, 
and their communications will be evaluated and judged. ‘Ethical practice requires the 
sustained judicious balancing of commitments and criteria, including when to engage in new 
performative actions’ (Lambek 2013: 844). Attempts to exert influence through bitching 
without, for example, fulfilling other ethical expectations of friendship can result in 
accusations of malevolent manipulation – ‘messing with people’ – and result in exclusion. 
Bitching can be directed at an ethical failure of practice (‘she’s not being a good friend’), and 
can also be a performative act that changes the criteria by which girls are judged.  
 Recognized as a ‘normal’ part of girls’ friendships, bitching is often practised through 
the intimacy and proximity of friendship space-time and illuminates both the mimetic and 
forensic dimensions of selves. Bitching is about the active shaping of others: everyone is 
bitching and bitched about, and everyone is vulnerable. Despite the ideal that friends know 
you and accept you for ‘your true inner self’, bitching represents an intimate exchange 
through which girls shape each other. At the same time, bitching is a practice of 
differentiation. Even in relations of ‘closest sameness’, bitching allows an emphasis on ‘what 
she’s like’, and, by implication, ‘what I’m not like’; this rests on ideas of the continuous self, 
‘accountable both for past acts and for living up to future commitments’ (Lambek 2013: 
848).  
Bitching and the ethics of individuality 
So far, I have discussed a range of friendship practices, including the performative acts 
through which the forensic or mimetic dimensions of selves are variously brought to the 
fore. While my discussion has focused on these notions as ways in which girls are producing 
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themselves in everyday life, this production is, of course, shaped by a broader context in 
which ‘the maximally socially distinct and temporally continuous individual is the ideological 
exemplar of the modern person’ (Lambek 2013: 842). Girls are making themselves and each 
other as particular kinds of persons in this context, and as we will see, their judgements are 
often based on criteria drawn from this ideology of individualism. 
 For example, a common subject of bitching is imitation. This might be in terms of 
copied clothes, hairstyle, favourite band, opinions, or ways of speaking? Like other aspects 
of friendship, accusations of copying often represent the tipping of a delicate balance. As 
friendship is the good match between pre-existing true selves, friends are expected to have 
lots in common. Similarities are seen as spontaneous, equal, and the expression of depth. 
Copying accusations arise when these similarities are judged as inauthentic, superficial, and 
not coming from ‘who you really are.’  Persistent copying is accepted as legitimate grounds 
for breaking friendships, and subsequent exclusion.  
 After being dumped by Lara, Lillian discovered she had been accused of copying. 
Lillian described copying as a key factor in the breakdown of another friendship made after 
Lara had dumped her. Lillian introduced her new friend, Maya, to her group, and this 
previously shy girl had, according to Lillian, copied her way of interacting with its members 
(who were mainly boys).  At first Lillian said she felt flattered by having her own ‘clone’, but 
then she began to feel that Maya was acting ‘more like me than I was’ and taking over her 
role in the group. Leah also expresses these tensions in friendship between expectations of 
similarity and expectations of difference:  
 Being good friends is a really hard thing. It’s like I’m me and I know who I am, then 
when you’re friends with someone you’re like ‘Don’t be you, be me’. But then it’s 
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like ‘No, don’t copy me, be you’ … Friendships are so much easier at the beginning, 
they’re much more difficult later on.   
 Another common, and related, subject of bitching is ‘inauthentic behaviour’; friends 
often assess if someone is ‘acting fake’, for example ‘changing their behaviour in front of a 
boy’, or ‘acting differently around different people’. Being ‘genuine’ rather than ‘fake’ is 
frequently given as an important quality for a friend to have. Leah observed the differences 
between Sophia inside and outside school, where they were both part of the same religious 
community. ‘Inside school she talks quite chavvy, outside school she talks quite posh’. As 
such, the reason she has very few friends in school, according to Leah, is ‘because she’s not 
being herself, everyone can just tell she’s not being herself, they don’t know who she is, 
they can just tell she’s not being herself’. As discussed earlier, talking and dressing like 
peers, as opposed to parents, was quite common in school and was not necessarily 
negatively judged. However, in the case of Sophia, this same behaviour was mobilized as 
evidence of inauthenticity, and her lack of friends was evidence of the unacceptability of 
this way of acting. While the presence of a ‘true, unchanging, inner self’ is central to the 
ideal of the forensic person, it can be legitimately evaluated and critiqued by peers. Failure 
is evidenced in terms of ‘fakeness’, ‘attention-seeking’ or ‘try-hard’, and success in terms of 
‘being yourself’. Subsequently, these evaluations of the forensic self can justify the mimetic 
shaping of others.  
 Thus, friendship is idealized both through depth and similarity, and through a correct 
order of things: selves who can be friends should come first, friendships second. When the 
correct order is judged to be reversed – as in the case of copying or faking – bitching and 
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exclusion often follow. In these ways, an ethical criterion of individualism is established, and 
action is evaluated within these terms. However, the possibility of change is also inherent in 
these judgements. Girls can redeem themselves through their actions and subsequently be 
judged accordingly: ‘She used to be really fake, she’s much more genuine now’ or ‘She used 
to be a copycat’.  
Conclusion  
]p[In this article, I have illuminated the ways in which girls’ ideals of friendship are 
implicated in the ideology of the forensic person, including a correct order of selves who can 
be friends first, and friendship second.  Making friends is thus understood as an increasing 
proximity between pre-existing like-minded selves, and friendship is defined in terms of this 
closeness as well as knowing each other’s depths. These ideals inform an ethical criterion of 
what it means to be a good friend, and this ethic is closely linked to an ethic of the forensic 
individual: real friends know the real you, and so copying and 'acting fake' (not being 
yourself) are an affront both to the ethics of friendship and to the ethics of individualism.  
 At the same time, a focus on the range of friendship practices highlights both the 
mimetic and forensic dimensions of girls’ selfhood, and the ways in which these dimensions 
are implicated in each other. As we have seen, friendship entails the mimetic effects of 
potentially being tarnished by another’s actions, while breaking friends reinstates forensic 
responsibility. Bitching depends on mimetic dimensions for efficacy as it ‘entails the ways in 
which what a person says and does draw from what other people have said or done, or 
serve in turn as examples or foils for others’ (Lambek 2013: 848). But bitching also entails 
differentiation and notions of individual responsibility, even between those defined in terms 
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of the ‘closest sameness’, and therefore also rests on ideas of the forensic self (who she is, 
who I am).  
 In all of this, ethics are intrinsic. The intensity and frequency of judgements which 
girls in school subject each other to can be observed in their interactions. Placing each other 
under particular sets of ‘descriptions, criteria, and commitments’ (Lambek 2013: 845), girls 
are invested in producing each other as particular kinds of ethical persons. Making friends, 
breaking friends, and bitching are examples of performative acts instantiating or changing 
criteria by which girls subsequently judge and are judged. As I have shown, the criteria are 
gendered – what it means to be a good friend, and a good person, is specific for girls. 
Furthermore, it is the ethical dimensions of action that justify some girls in exerting their 
will, and extending their intersubjective influence. Through inclusion and exclusion, and the 
creation and maintenance of particular formations of closeness and distance, girls are 
creating social fields structured through time, space, exchange and ethics.  
 If there has been a historical tendency in anthropology to accept the ideal of the 
forensic Western person, a study of friendships offers a productive step to counterbalancing 
this. It encourages a focus on intersubjectivity, and the quality and nature of engagement 
between persons. As such, the study of friendship can contribute towards a more 
satisfactory understanding of personhood in ‘the West’, derived from the ethnography of 
everyday practices of real people rather than the ideas of political philosophers (Ouroussoff 
1993; Toren 1999). In this article, I have utilized the mimetic and forensic as analytic strands 
through which to capture the fundamental sociality of the production of girls’ personhood – 
without denying that individuality is experienced and valued by girls in their daily lives.  
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NOTES 
I would like to thank Mwenza Blell and Hillary Watterman for their very helpful comments 
on earlier drafts of this article. I am also grateful to Matthew Engelke, Matei Candea, and 
the JRAI anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and guidance.   
 1 Fieldwork took place in 2007-8. The research was made possible by a Brunel Social Sciences Studentship.  
 2 All the pupils discussed in this article are Year 11s (15-16 year olds), except for Year 13’s Jane, Megan, and 
Eleanor (17-18 year olds). 
 3 While girls and boys described themselves as friends with each other, most peer groups were single gender. 
Often, however, these had close links to an opposite-gender group, and class friendships (see note 6) were 
often mixed gender. 
 4 There were some exceptions to this pattern, for example the self-named ‘Misfits’ were a large group 
comprised of a majority of boys and a minority of girls, while an exceptional few girls were friends only with 
boys.  
 5 As such, it is also important to recognize that definitions and processes of friendship and their attendant 
affects and effects may vary not only cross-culturally but also over the course of a lifetime (see, e.g., Jerrome 
1981 on women’s friendships in later life). 
 6 These friendships are often called class friendships, because although valued, they do not extend beyond the 
classroom to shared peer group spaces.  Difference does not preclude notions of closeness, but closeness is 
defined in a more limited sense, with no expectation of shared time or space except in the classroom (see 
Winkler-Reid 2015). Liking, a personal and positive evaluation and appreciation of the person, is the starting-
point for all friendships, regardless of whether they are defined in terms of difference or sameness. 
 7 The set of exams taken by 15-16 year olds in Britain.  
 8 A person might not necessarily be classified/identify in terms of both of these ways. For example, South 
American and Middle Eastern students were understood as ‘not white’ and ‘from somewhere’, but did not fit 
within the simple racial classification system.  
 9 In contrast, Graham Allan writes about adult friendship:  ‘The first feature to note about real or true 
friendships is that they frequently continue even though face-to-face interaction is rare’ (1979: 66). Again, this 
illustrates the importance of appreciating the situational and life-stage-related dimensions of friendship. 
10 The year group was split into two for administration, band one and band two.  
11 An American teen comedy film about status and popularity among girls in high school, released in 2003. 
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